**ARCTIC CIRCLE SECURITY PANEL**

**Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security’s Panel on Security of the Arctic**

At the 2nd Arctic Circle

In Reykjavik, Iceland in October 31 – November 2, 2014

**Final Report**

Prof. Lassi Heininen (9/2/2015)

The Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security – a joint network by the University of the Arctic and the Northern Research Forum – organizes the 2nd international academic panel on *“Security of the Arctic”*, in cooperation with the Northern Research Forum, in October 31 – November 2, 2014 in Reykjavik, Iceland as a part of the *2nd Arctic Circle*. The panel consisted of four breakout sessions with different titles, sub-themes and focus (see below). Each session included 5-10 speakers – altogether 25 presenters – who are experts on security studies and / or Arctic issues (see below titles of the presentations and names of the speakers), a moderator and an open discussion (questions & comments). The panel was designed and led by Prof. Lassi Heininen from University of Lapland, Finland.

All the sessions of the Security Panel engaged good audiences and good number of both professional and other interested participants who created lively discussions, many of which consisted of two rounds. All in all, the TN on Geopolitics and Security achieved all of their primary goals by the panel. The financial support by the Social Sciences WG of IASC was very important for to bring on the one hand, and first of all, young researchers from North America, Europe, Russia and Asia to attend and present a paper. On the other hand, it made it possible for the members of the SSWG, Prof. Gunhild Hoogenson Gjörv and Prof. Lassi Heininen to prepare the panel and attend there as paper presenters, moderators and chairs.

The TN look forward to organizing activities in conjunction with the 2015 Arctic Circle in Iceland as part of our respective 2015 events either as a part of the AC conference program and/or back-to-back with the AC. Among the planned activities is the 3rd panel on Security of the Arctic.

**Program and Schedule of the Security Panel**

**The 1st Day, October 31, 2014 at 17:00-18:30**

Breakout session 1 - Arctic Security

Theme: *The Nexus of the Environment, Resource Extraction, Global Economy, State Sovereignty, and Global Governance – an Arctic (Security) Paradox*

The theme includes among others the following sub-themes / points of view: Global (security) problems and challenges in the Arctic: climate change and the ‘Anthropocene’, the mass-scale utilization of resources, the interplay between human security, resource geopolitics, regional development, and human rights; Global security interests within, and dealing with, the Arctic by local, regional and external actors, and sovereignty over the region.

Among the proposed titles of presentations and names of potential speakers are:

* Matthias Finger, EPFL, Switzerland: *“Too scary to be true, or the denial, of the GlobalArctic”*
* Audur H. Ingolfsdottir, Bifröst University, Iceland*: "Climate change and offshore oil and gas drilling in the Arctic: Tension between environmental and economic security"*
* Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, UiT The Arctic University of Norway: *“Do values and politics trump science? The dynamics between energy, environment and economy security in the Arctic”*
* Heather N. Nicol, Trent University, Department of Geography: *“Neoliberal discourses and their influence on economic development, state sovereignty and bordering in the Canadian Arctic”*
* Steven Lamy and Reid Lidow, University of Southern California, USA: “*Governing the Arctic region: Evaluating the ASEAN analogue, and lessons from other regional treaties”*

Open discussion (questions & comments)

**The 2nd Day, November 1, 2014 at 17:00-18:30**

Breakout session 2 - Arctic Security

Theme: *Military Strategies and Defense Policies in, and Impacts of Recent Crises on, Security of the Arctic*

The theme includes among others the following sub-themes / points of view: Military perspective on the Arctic region, and military strategies and defense policies of the Arctic states; National peculiarities of security premises, paradigms and rhetoric in the Arctic, as well as the Northern Atlantic (e.g. Iceland’s security and defense policy in the 21st century; priorities of Russia’s and US’s new military strategies); Impacts of current regional crises and wars (e.g. the Ukrainian crisis, the fight against international terror / ISIS) on security of the globalized Arctic.

Among the proposed titles of presentations and names of potential speakers are:

* Stéphane Roussel, ENAP and Frédéric Lasserre, Université Laval, Quebec, Canada:

*“Russian Flights and the Canadian Arctic: media reports, military statements, and meanings for Canadian sovereignty and security"*

* Barbora Padrtova, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, Slovak Republic: *“Russian military build-up and aggressive rhetoric – how it influences the cooperation in the Arctic”*

* Alexander Sergunin, St. Petersburg State University, Russia:*“Russia’s Military Strategies in the Arctic: looking for new priorities?”*
* Valery Konyshev, St. Petersburg State University, Russia: *“The U.S. Military Strategies in the High North: in search of a new ‘identity’?”*
* Michael T. Corgan, University of Boston, USA: “*Will the US discover the Arctic once again?”*

Open discussion (questions & comments)

**The 2nd Day, November 1, 2014 at 18:30-20:00**

Breakout session 3 - Arctic Security

Theme: *Future Security of the Arctic – Environmental / Human Security, Maritime Safety, Economic development, Energy Security and International Treaties*

The theme includes among others the following sub-themes / points of view: The future and safety of Arctic shipping; Energy securities; Role of international maritime law, regional regimes and political responses and measures for stewardship of the Arctic Ocean (e.g. UNCLOS, the SAR Agreement, Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, the ‘Polar Code’, Ecosystem-based management Plan etc...).

Among the proposed titles of presentations and names of potential speakers are:

* Suzanne Lalonde, University of Montreal, Quebec, Canada: *“Role of International Law in fostering environmental security in Arctic waters”*
* Malte Humpert, the Arctic Institute, USA: *“The Future of Arctic shipping: a new Silk Road for China?”*
* Jussi Huotari and Hanna Lempinen, University of Lapland, Finland*: “Energy Securities – perspectives from and to the Arctic energyscape”*
* Bertel Heurlin, University of Copenhagen, Denmark*: “Comparing and explaining the role of the United States and China in the territorially disputed sub-regions of the South China Sea and the Arctic”*
* ZHANG Pei, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, China: *“The Evolving concept of security, and security in the Arctic”*

Open discussion (questions & comments)

**The 3rd Day, November 2, 2014 at 17:00-20:00**

Breakout session 4 - Arctic Security

Theme: *Future Security of the Arctic II – Local and Regional Security, (State) Sovereignty, National and regional Security, and New Security Actors*

The theme includes among others the following sub-themes / points of view: Security for whom, and by whom – defining subjects of security; Local, regional and global security; Security from the point of view of Indigenous peoples; ‘Paradiplomacy’; (Re)defining a state of comprehensive security, and shifts in security premises and paradigm, of the globalized Arctic.

Among the proposed titles of presentations and names of potential speakers are:

* Justin Massie, UQAM and Joel Plouffe, ENAP, Quebec, Canada: *“Diplomatic Spillover? Assessing the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on Canada-Russian relations”*
* Jessica Shadian, AIAS-Marie Curie COFUND Fellow, Århus University, Canada: “*Mukloks on the ground: Community-based monitoring and regional Arctic governance – shall the twain ever meet?”*
* Gleb Yarovoy, Petrozavodsk State University, Russia: *"Bottom-up security. Paradiplomacy as the last chance for keeping in touch in the (European) Arctic“,*
* Maria Ackrén, Ilisimatusarfik/University of Greenland: *“Hearing processes in Greenland regarding the mining industry*”
* Heather Exner-Pirot, University of Saskatchewan, Canada: *“Linking the ‘Local’ with the ‘Global’: Disconnects in Arctic policymaking”*

Open discussion (questions & comments)

Break

* Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Aalborg University, Denmark: *“Asia, new stakeholders in North Atlantic security?”*
* SU Ping, Tongji University, China: *“China and Arctic security”*
* Gustav Petursson, University of Lapland, Iceland: *“Icelandic security and defence policy in the 21st century: Towards a Nordic security community*”
* Michal Luszczuk, Jan Kochanowski University, Poland: *“A Threat or an opportunity? Exploring the European and Canadian attitudes towards the globalized Arctic”*
* Lassi Heininen, University of Lapland, Finland: *“The Global Arctic as a potential ground for a paradigm shift of Arctic security”*

Open discussion (questions & comments)

**List of Speakers and Abstracts**

Maria Ackrén,

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*Hearing Processes in Greenland Regarding the Mining Industry,*

**Abstract:**

The recent developments regarding Greenland's economy is lying in the hands of the Self-Government and the right to utilize natural resources. The power of taking over the underground in Greenland dates back to the decision in 2010. Earlier efforts was made already back in the 1970s, when discussions around home-rule was on the agenda. Mining industries are not a totally new affair in Greenland, since the 1920s and especially during the Second World War Greenland was utilized as a mining community for North America. The resources of cryolite were e.g. then used for producing aluminium for the air-craft industry. Some other essential natural resources as gold and gem stones have also been of international interest over the years. The new development is to build up a large scale form of mining industry. For example, the London Mining project in the *Godthåbsfjord* is one of the biggest investments to date, where iron ore will be exploited.

There has been a massive critique against the new developments of large scale industries amongst the local population. The locals feel that they have not received enough information of all the challenges and possible effects of these kind of projects, even though several hearing processes have been launched. One of the largest problems have been that the locals have been involved very late in the process, while all major decisions already have been made. Some politicians do claim that people have been informed several years beforehand and that this development should therefore not come as a total surprise. There are thousands of pages of technical data to be read about every project on the Internet, but these documents are hard to read and interpret. Another problem has been the form of the hearing processes themselves. These events have been merely in the form of information meetings to the public and not the form of hearing processes that is more used, for instance, in Canada where several actors are involved from the beginning to the end and can therefore have more influence on decisions made.

This article will elucidate the form of hearing processes that have been made in Greenland regarding the large scale projects and the different views various actors have regarding these events. Here the main actors are the authorities, politicians and local people themselves. The theoretical framework will be taken from general theories about political participation, especially the form of deliberative democracy that has lately become a topical form of interest amongst political scientists. Deliberation can be seen as a form of direct involvement of people within a decision-making process, where standpoints can shift from beginning to end. It is the closest form of political participation we come regarding the hearing processes or public consultations that have been in the forefront regarding the large-scale projects in Greenland.

The article will give some background information about the mining history in Greenland and then be focused on the recent developments. Further, some references to Canadian examples will be made as a comparison. Examples of how the authorities are handling the mining projects in relation to SIA (Social Impact Assessment) will also be explained and two of the mining projects will be used to illustrate and exemplify the hearing processes: the London Mining Project and TANBREEZ. These two projects are of very different nature, since the first one is related to iron ore mining outside Nuuk, while the latter is related to metals and rare earth elements located in the South of Greenland. The two projects are also at different stages in their process of actually becoming realized. The London Mining project has been given the green light to begin with their exploitation since 24 October 2013, when the decision was made, while the TANBREEZ project still is waiting for its final decision, which will probably be made during 2015.

The development in Greenland is in a very decisive period at the moment and things are happening in a rapid pace. There are divided perspectives on the large-scale projects. Some people are in favour while others ask what environmental and health risks and social impacts these projects will lead to in contrast with the economic benefits these projects will contribute to the society at large. As other examples in other parts of the world have showed, the challenge is to find a balance between accommodating aspirations for self-government, independence, indigenous sovereignty and development with the existence and dominance of multinational corporations in the economic life of the community.

PhD Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen,

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## *Asia, new Stakeholders in North Atlantic Security?*

**Abstract:**

The North Atlantic has played a central role in Western geopolitics and security for centuries and especially since World War Two. The North Atlantic has and remains key to communications between North America and Western Europe. The North Atlantic communications line between North America and Western Europe was key to strategy, geopolitics, security and war fighting during WWII and continued to be so during the Cold War. Nazi Germany tried to cut off these lines of communications with submarine warfare, and the Northern Fleet of the USSR was destined to break out of the Kola Peninsula and cut off these lines of communications. Flight and missile technology made the Arctic a key theatre of the Cold War as the shortest flight pattern between North America and Eurasia. This security environment made the small states of the North Atlantic and the great powers on the rim its stakeholders. The North Atlantic remains a key geostrategic space for the small Nordic states in the region and the USA, Canada, UK, Russia and Germany. However, the Arctic is changing fundamentally due to environmental and political-economic globalization with climate change and the rise of Asia. Diminishing Arctic Ocean sea ice may open new sea-lanes between Northeast Asia and Northwest Europe, two of the centers of the world economy. Rapidly growing Asian economies are export-based economies deeply dependent on global shipping. These new shipping lanes end or originate in the North Atlantic, which make large Asian economies as China, Japan and South Korea stakeholders in North Atlantic security. Also, with a future bipolar strategic competition between the USA and China, the Arctic will be important for nuclear strategic deterrence and early warning between the two. This paper will therefore discuss whether China, Japan and South Korea may be future stakeholders in North Atlantic security.

Michael T. Corgan,

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*Will the US Discover the Arctic Once Again?[[1]](#footnote-1)*

**Abstract:**

The US has been widely characterized as an Arctic power with relatively little interest in the region. But that may change shortly. In July 2014 Secretary of State John Kerry did appoint a Special Representative for the Arctic, retired Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp, thus utilizing the human capital of the government agency with arguably the most interest in and greatest knowledge of the region. Moreover several US government institutions, the Coast Guard Academy and the Naval War College have now instituted centers for Arctic studies. Given the other pressing foreign affairs issues for the government will these actions nevertheless begin a development of greater Arctic awareness by the US? This paper looks at the likelihood.

Dr. Heather Exner-Pirot,

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*Linking the Local with the Global: Disconnects in Arctic Policymaking,*

**Abstract:**

Although the Arctic Council identified as its twin mandates in the Ottawa Declaration of 1996 both sustainable development and environmental protection, there can be no doubt that it has been much more successful and active with the latter. The Canadian Chairmanship has identified “Development for the People of the North” as its priority during its tenure at the helm of the Arctic Council. However rather than pushing the pillar forward, it has mostly served to illustrate how difficult it is to promote human development at a regional level. This paper will explore regional efforts made in the past twenty years to promote human development in the Arctic; explain some of the barriers to securing progress on this issue; and identify some of the more promising issue areas where a regional approach to development makes practical sense.

Prof, Matthias Finger,

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*Too scary to be true or the denial of the GlobalArctic,*

**Abstract**

The GlobalArctic is a perfect illustration of the anthropogenic impact of industrial civilization, also called the Anthropocene. Indeed, in the Arctic the impact of industrial civilization in the form of global warming and related consequences is observable and felt more strongly than anywhere else on the planet. Simultaneously, the global implications of climate change in the Arctic are particularly important. All this has already been argued elsewhere and is actually well known. In this paper I will analyze why this dynamics in and of the GlobalArctic is not only under-researched but flatly ignored or, more accurately, “denied”. Such denial is best analyzed in ethno-psychoanalytic terms. It consequently raises questions of ontological security and is, as such, perfectly illustrative of the attitude of Humanity vis-à-vis its own impacts on the planet. This paper will identify, describe and critically analyze this denial of the GlobalArctic from a combined psychoanalytic, anthropological and philosophical perspectives. Empirically it is grounded on a systematic analysis of important newspaper articles published in the global press.

Bertel Heurlin,

University of Copenhagen, Denmark

*Comparing and Explaining the Role of the United States and China in the Territorially Disputed Sub Regions of the South China Sea and the Arctic,*

**Abstract**

Maritime policies are an increasingly important part of international relations. Access to resources, seaways, transport capabilities, and R&D are all factors that involve security. This is not least the case as concerns international regulations and national sovereignty. Maritime policies include competitive, cooperative and conflicting interests and are part of the different views of developing and developed countries and the opponents and supporters of the current world order. Two countries are of specific interest: The superpower the United States and the upcoming regional and global power China. How do they- in security terms – assess and react to two very different sub regions- the South China Sea and the Arctic Area. Both states are heavily involved in the South China Sea maritime disputes, and to an increasingly degree in the Arctic area. The paper first try to establish a comparison of the current security situation in the two sub regions seen from an international system perspective using notions from neorealism, geopolitics and geo-economics. Second it will identify and analyze the official policies of the US and China towards the two sub regions in terms of objectives, capabilities and strategies (goals, means and ways). Third it will try to explain the basic policies of the two countries and the political outcome in structural terms. Four, the paper will look at current and future relations between the two sub regions a broader security perspective.

Literature: Houlden, Gordon and Hong Nong, eds., 2012,”Maritime Security Issues in the South China Sea and the Arctic: Sharpened Competition or Collaboration?”, China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House, Beijing; Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, 2003, “ Regions and Powers”, Cambridge.

Prof. Lassi Heininen,

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*The Global Arctic as a potential ground, or ‘workshop’ for to recognize and analyse relevant changes in problem definition of security paradigms*

**Abstract**

The Arctic region is a key part of the global ecosystem, heavily impacted by climate change, megatrends and other global changes, and is closely integrated within current global economics and related energy security dynamics, and plays a role in world politics. Now the aggressively expanding exploitation of resources, particularly off-shore hydrocarbons, and the governance of them, as well as growing use of northern sea routes, brings new and more dangerous environmental and societal risks to the Arctic and its people(s). Moreover, the Arctic, particularly the Arctic Ocean, has become recognized as an environmental linchpin globally, as a sink of long-range pollutants and a target area of rapid climate change. In addition to this, the Arctic states and indigenous peoples have managed to exchange the confrontational politics of the Cold War into meaningful cooperation and stability by adopting environmental protection as the main platform for functional cooperation. This was manifested in the AEPS, entered into by ministers of the eight Arctic states in 1991, and results of these transformations of the Arctic region are illustrated through two powerful trends: first, the increasing circumpolar cooperation by indigenous peoples and subnational governments; and second, region-building by nation-states, focusing on the Arctic Council. Thus, there are also indigenous peoples (organizations) that seek to emphasize their identities; sub-national governments in charge of regional development; NGOs with their concerns, as well as academic communities producing knowledge. There is also a trend towards the reconceptualization of sovereignty, with the argument being made that the Arctic agenda is no longer only about inter-state relationships and economic activities, but rather about realizing knowledge-based potential to implement sustainable use of resources. It is in this context that the Arctic states have adopted their strategies, all of which emphasize economic activities, and many of which emphasize sovereignty, as the major national priority ahead of environmental protection. Now there is another ‘boom’ of growing regional and international interests of the Arctic states and observer countries of the AC, as well as their SOEs, in trying to benefit from better access to energy resources and improve their energy security. Following from this, in the globalized Arctic there is now an ‘Arctic Paradox’ which refers to the keen interrelations between the physical impacts of climate change on the one hand, and on the other hand, a growing need to decrease GHG emissions and mitigate climate change. A part of the whole picture is the recent shift in the AC’s focus from environment protection towards ‘economic development’, which easily causes an assumption that the current resource development agenda has much created this ‘paradox’: In spite of adopted international treaties and legally-binding agreements concerning the Arctic environment, as well as national plans for industrial management to minimize environmental risks, the Arctic states have not been willing to adopt more strict environmental regulations against the off-shore petroleum industry. Behind this political inability are, e.g., a lack of implementation of the two pillars of the AC (as stated by the Arctic states) to affirm “our commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic,… to the protection of the Arctic environment” (Ottawa Declaration 1996). Finally, this new state of resource geopolitics, which shows that the ‘Anthropocene’ is already at play in the Arctic, is challenging the unique Arctic ecosystem, human security of peoples, as well as traditionally defined state sovereignty. In short, the Arctic has become globalized, and can no longer be studied independently of the global dynamics. It constitutes a perfect case in point: not only is it the result of global changes, but it also affects the rest of the globe and further global changes. All this makes the Arctic a potential, or even very promising, ground or workshop for to recognize and analyze relevant changes sin problem definition of security premises and paradigms.

The presentation will firstly, briefly describe and define a state of the Arctic region and its recent multifunctional changes, as well as main drivers and actors behind them, concentrating on resources; Secondly, it will explain and discuss on the globalized Arctic - the related global drivers and multi-functional effects, as well as its global implications - as a new geopolitical context and analyze its impacts in the region and challenges to the state of state sovereignty; Thirdly, the presentation will critically analyze the state of resource geopolitics, and its main outcomes and challenges, e.g. what happens when the ‘bonanza’ of the exploitation is over? Finally, it will ask what might be the ultimate ‘price’ that will be accepted as a cost of (further) development in the Arctic and globally, and whom the ‘price’ will be the highest for. Furthermore, what is needed for alternative approaches to promote development in, and for, the region?

Prof. Gunhild Hoogensen-Gjørv,

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*Do values and politics trump science? The dynamics between energy, environment and economy security in the Arctic,*

**Abstract:**

The following paper takes its departure point in the so-called "ethical oil" arguments which has played a significant role in debates about the oil sands developments in Alberta, Canada, and examines the linkages between notions of ethics, values and perceptions of security (particularly energy and environmental security) in the context of the oil and gas industry, as well as the “drilling for the environment” position of Norwegian oil and gas exploration. The paper will examine the extent to which "ethics" informs policy and in relation to the values to be secured. It will further assess the degree to which state-based security thinking (energy, environmental and economical security) reflects or competes with human security needs at the individual and community levels in the Arctic – is the drive for continued (if not increased) extractive industries a part of the security framework for communities as well as for states? Or are states creating insecure spaces for some or all Arctic communities? These values, that inform security thinking, appear to be based in types of knowledge and power of knowledge about linkages between energy needs and use, and the environment (not least in relation to climate change). The end result is a contested space between knowledge, land, and ethics/values which find different political expressions. I explore the ways in which the contested spaces around oil and gas development are being negotiated in Canada and in Norway using a multi-actor security framework, showing how ethics/values affect the competing ideologies that inform how northern states and communities are talking about their future.

Malte Humpert,

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*The Future of Arctic Shipping: A New Silk Road for China?*(United States)

**Abstract**

Every time Arctic sea ice extent reaches a new record low a host of new reports and studies predict a rapid increase in shipping activities in the Arctic. Expectations are high that Arctic shipping routes, particularly the Northern Sea Route, will rival traditional shipping routes and complement the Suez Canal route as a key waterway for trade to and from Asia by the middle of this century. One of the drivers of Arctic shipping, as the logic goes, is China’s rapidly growing international trade. As China aims to diversify its trade routes and reduce its dependence on trade passing through the Strait of Malacca, the Arctic offers an alternative and shorter route to conduct part of its trade. How realistic are such scenarios? Trans-Arctic shipping is most viable where it offers a significant shortcut in comparison to traditional trade routes. In the case of China, this applies only to its trade with Europe, especially Central and Northern Europe. Trade with all other regions, including Africa, the Americas, and the Middle East, will not be routed though the Arctic even if ice-free periods were to increase dramatically. China’s existing trade patterns offer little opportunity to take advantage of Arctic distance savings. Its major trade routes are far removed from the Arctic as most of its imports arrive from its direct neighbors, such as Japan and South Korea, or from countries near to or south of the equator, such as Australia and Brazil. Trade with Northern Europe, the region most relevant to Arctic shipping, accounts for just 2.9 percent of China’s international trade. Over the next two decades Chinese trade within the Asia-Pacific region and with countries in the southern hemisphere will experience the sharpest growth. Africa and Latin America will be supplying a growing share of China’s commodity needs. The importance of Europe as one of China’s major trading partners, on the other hand, will decline over the coming decades. In fact, China has been investing heavily in port infrastructure throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe and has built an extensive network of ports in which it holds a stake. None of these investments point to the Arctic being considered as a new transportation corridor. China’s Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) has shown little interest in Arctic shipping as it continues to invest heavily in ports along the Suez Canal route. After more than a decade of delays, a new generation of Ultra Large Container Ships (ULCS), about twice the size of existing vessels, is about to enter into service. As container ships are becoming increasingly larger to take advantage of economies of scale, draft and beam restrictions will prevent a growing share of the global merchant fleet to transit the northernmost ocean along the NSR. Furthermore, the absence of major ports throughout the Arctic Ocean makes it impossible for operators to benefit from network economics. A similar trend can be observed in the bulk-shipping sector. As in the container shipping business, economies of scale allow for the transport of raw materials over vast distances at ever-decreasing rates. Specialized Arcticmax ships will be unable to compete with these new realities. Future shipping in the Polar region will mostly consist of seasonal destinational transport, delivering supplies into the Arctic for its increasing economic activity and transporting the region’s natural resources to markets in East Asia. Apart from these niche opportunities, Arctic shipping routes will be unable to compete with the world’s existing major trade routes. Thus, while climate change will, over the coming decades, transform the frozen north into a seasonally navigable ocean, Arctic shipping routes will not become a new silk road for China.

*Note: The Article will contain numerous custom maps and infographics displaying the flow of China’s imports and exports, as well as the flow of goods along the NSR.*

Auður H Ingólfsdóttir,

assistant professor,

Bifröst University, Iceland

*Climate Change and Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling in the Arctic: Tension between environmental and economic security,*

**Abstract**

Climate change is having a profound impact on the Arctic environment. The melting of the Arctic ice cap will increase accessibility to the region which brings both new opportunities and risks. While most Arctic states have the capacity to adapt to moderate changes in climate, more dramatic changes are likely to exceed the adaptation capacity of even the more well off states, which can create multiple security threats. Thus, mitigation is a vital component of enhancing climate security in the long run. This presentation will explore the options available to the small Arctic states (the Nordics) to strengthen their climate security through mitigation and how such strategies might clash with other goals related to economic security. The key argument introduced in the presentation is that although small states are unable to use their military or economic power to change the behavior of large states, they have the opportunity to influence international discourses and act as norms entrepreneurs. In the long run, this will help enhance their environmental security. The power to shape norms, however, will be weakened if domestic policies are in conflict with the ideals small states are advocating in international forums. Of special interest in this context is the tension between an ambitious climate policies and plans those same states might have to explore new oil and gas fields that now are becoming more accessible because of climate change. Examples will be taken from Iceland, Greenland and Norway.

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*Energy securities - Perspectives from and to the Arctic energyscape,*

Abstract

Energy security has again gained a prominent role in political discourse in the interplay of growing global energy demand, declining reserves at existing production sites as well as growing resource nationalism in producing countries. Hence, the securitization of energy, implying that energy is not just a question of generating electricity, oil and gas and earning export income, but also a question of national security for producers as well as trade partners. Despite its role as a key argument and a powerful rhetorical tool, the concept of energy security is seldom explicitly defined. In our presentation we address the political and theoretical debates revolving around the notion of energy security through a case study focus on the Arctic energyscape: the world’s new energy province characterized simultaneously by tremendous energy wealth and extreme energy poverty.

International Energy Agency IEA (2014) defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”. Academic debates and definitions echo, broaden and challenge this viewpoint both through accentuating and adding dimensions and components to the concept. Furthermore, debates familiar from broader security discourses – i.e. the concerns over the referent object(s) and provider(s) of security – also link to the energy security debate, as do questions of scale. In our presentation, we begin to project these theoretical debates to the case study of the vast and diverse Arctic energyscape as a part of the global energy world.

Prof. Valery Konyshev

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*The U.S. military strategies in the High North: in search of a new ‘identity’?*

**Abstract**

This study argues that presently the U.S. military face an uneasy dilemma. On the one hand, Washington tries to keep its military potential in the region at the sufficient level to fulfill its traditional missions – to contain any nuclear or conventional threat, protect the U.S. national interests in the Arctic and ensure the freedom of navigation and overflight. On the other hand, the U.S. armed forces have to find new roles in the High North to meet the requirements set by the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region of 2013. The latter instructs the U.S. military to be ready to cope with the soft rather than hard security threats and challenges and to act in a multilateral rather than unilateral regional context. More specifically, the paper examines the U.S. national security agencies’ recent Arctic strategies – the Department of Defense, Navy and Coast Guard ones – with the aim to find out whether these documents are consonant with Barak Obama’s general Arctic strategy or not.

Prof. Steve Lamy

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Reid Lidow,

USC, USA

*Governing the Arctic region: Evaluating the ASEAN analogue, and lessons from other regional treaties,*

**Abstract:**

While tensions in the Arctic are not as heated as many portray them to be, initiatives can be undertaken today that will hedge against the possibility for future conflict tomorrow. At present, Arctic governance models look to the Antarctic as an analogue, yet it is the view of this author that this vision is misguided. The states and actors that engage in the Antarctic have a different set of priorities than those actors operating in the Arctic. In searching for an analogue, the ASEAN model should be considered as it reflects a similar set of geopolitical challenges (i.e. resources, competing territorial claims, etc.) facing the Arctic. Through careful management and cooperation, the regional behemoth that is ASEAN has remained conflict free. This paper will conclude making policy recommendations drawing on the strengths and weaknesses of the ASEAN governance model as they pertain to Arctic. This governance research reflects original scholarship in the field as the Arctic-ASEAN governance analogue has yet to be drawn.

**Part 1: Prevailing Arctic Governance Analogues: Antarctic Model**

When calling upon an analogue or relevant model to be applied to governance in the Arctic, the Antarctic governance structure is often brought into focus. While this model does offer some utility, particularly with respect to inter-governmental cooperation, the fundamental gulf in landscapes between the Arctic and Antarctic limits its utility. Furthermore, the claims spurring Arctic exploration and disagreements (namely resource, territorial, commercial etc.) differ vastly from Antarctic pursuits (primarily scientific). This section will highlight the weaknesses of the Antarctic analogue before bridging into a discussion on ASEAN.

**Part 2**: **A Brief Overview of ASEAN, Relevant Norms, ZOPFAN**

We begin by looking at the historical setting for ASEAN’s creation – August 1967 as the Vietnam War rages causing regional instability. Underpinning ASEAN’s initial 5 state association are 4 core goals:

1. Accelerate economic growth
2. Social progress
3. Cultural growth in the region
4. Promote regional peace and stability through respect for justice and the rule of law

In 2007, these 4 goals were reinforced in the 2007 ASEAN Charter Signed by the 10 member states:

1. “Respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of member state”
2. “Peaceful settlement of disputes”
3. “Non-interference in member states’ internal affairs”
4. “Right to live without external interference”

The above four factors, along with several others, constitute the normative backbone of the “ASEAN Way.” In addition to these norms, the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration holds particular relevance to the Arctic region. In this document, the 5 founding ASEAN members vow to “make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation” between them. Certain structures within ASEAN hold particular relevance to Arctic governance.

**Part 3: Case Study: Adjudication of Pedra Branca Islands**

The Singapore-Malaysia Pedra Branca case is thoroughly covered in Ming Ting’s *Singapore-Malaysia Relations: Beyond Realism*. The broad details of the case are as follows: after several decades of disputed ownership, the two states agreed to have the issue adjudicated in the ICJ – and honor the outcome – so as to avoid prolonged tensions over the rocks. The case was heard in 2007, and in 2008 the ICJ ruled in favor of Singapore. While Malaysia was displeased with the decision and initially pushed back, it has been honored and relations between the two states remain positive. The purpose of this case study, is to highlight that cooperation can be achieved in SE Asia, a hotly contested global region. Thus, this author will go on to argue that the ASEAN analogue “holds water” and is worthy of consideration as a governance analogue in the Arctic.

**Part 4: Tailoring the ASEAN Model to the Arctic**

Perhaps the most notable fact linked to ASEAN is that no tensions have escalated into armed conflict since being established in 1967. While the view of this author is that the Arctic is not as conflict “hot” as many think it is, adopting an ASEAN ZOPFAN approach is a good hedge against any future escalations in tension. Already, states bordering the Arctic have been proactive in establishing a normative framework espousing peace, as seen in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration. This section will discuss the areas where the ASEAN model is particularly relevant to the Arctic region, while also dismissing certain ASEAN components that are not applicable.

**Part 5: Concluding Policy Prescriptions**

Similar to a think-tank policy report, this section will draw upon the ASEAN model and conclude offering several concrete policy prescriptions for relevant Arctic decision-makers, both in their respective states and at the Arctic Council level.

**About the Authors**:

**Steven Lamy** is vice dean for academic programs in the University of Southern California's Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences, and is a professor in USC's School of International Relations. As vice dean, he oversees all undergraduate and graduate programs in the college. He earned his Ph.D. in international relations from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver. His areas of expertise include international relations theory, foreign policy analysis, the foreign policies of the U.S. European states Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and teaching and curriculum development in international relations. Dr. Lamy has published more than 45 articles and book chapters in these areas. Oxford University Press published his most recent book, "Introduction to Global Politics," in August 2010. A second edition was published in 2012. His current work on global governance focuses on both environmental issues and human security.

**Reid Lidow** earned dual B.A. degrees in political science and international relations from the University of Southern California in December 2013. For the past three years, he has served as a research assistant for Professor Steven Lamy. Additionally, he has shown an impressive dedication to research, particularly with respect to Southeast Asia security affairs. This has led Reid to travel overseas, including three times to Burma, where he has conducted interviews with leading political figures and dissidents. His research has resulted in the publication of six articles. Lidow was awarded a highly competitive Gates Cambridge Scholarship and will attend the University of Cambridge this fall where he will pursue an MPhil in development studies.

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*Role of International Law in Fostering Environmental Security in Arctic Waters,*

**Abstract**

The Arctic Ocean is at the threshold of significant changes. The impacts of these changes will be felt, not just by the wildlife, but by the people who live on the margins of the Arctic Ocean, and particularly, by the traditional communities who derive their subsistence from its marine mammals and fisheries. At the same time, opportunities are expanding for economic activities and development of the Arctic region’s natural resources. Three new development opportunities in particular—the prospect of new shipping routes, expanded oil and gas development and new commercial fishing—could generate system-wide environmental impacts and will therefore likely pose novel management challenges for the Arctic nations and the international community. While the current law of the sea regime assigns primary responsibility for the marine environment to the Arctic coastal States within their 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone, the Arctic Ocean’s most important living resources are part of a single ecosystem that transcends national boundaries. Expanded industrial and other human activities in the Arctic will inevitably affect the entire ecosystem. For this reason, the effective protection of those areas of the Arctic Ocean beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJs), the so-called Arctic donut hole, is of vital importance if a truly holistic management of the Arctic seascape is to be achieved. This paper will discuss what role existing international legal mechanisms can play in fostering and supporting environmental security in Arctic waters. Legal concepts such as marine protected areas (MPAs), particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSAs) or MARPOL ‘special areas’ will be the particular focus of the presentation.

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*Is the North Pole (still) Canadian? And why it is important?,*

**Abstract**

On 6 December 2013 the Canadian government introduced its file claims at the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. However, surprisingly, this issue concerns only the areas of the North Atlantic, leaving aside the claims in the Arctic, yet most anticipated. According to the *Globe & Mail,* Prime Minister Harper asked Canadian scientists to review their data to the geographic North Pole is included in the file submitted to the United Nations. The Prime Minister would have done so because he believes that this is a historical claim and that resources may rest in this sector. Yet this is an amazing position, because this decision requires Canada to exceed the deadline set by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This paper aims, on one hand, to evaluate the arguments put forward by the Prime Minister for his decision. Will he actually historical continuity in Canadian attitudes towards the North Pole? What is the value of this argument? And is that the available data indicate the presence of significant resources in this area? On the other hand, it explores alternative hypotheses, including one that would have the main issue related to the request for inclusion of the cluster is symbolic and identity-in the sense that it reinforces an established belief among Canadians, and it reinforces his sense of connection to a northern national and international identity of Canada.

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*Diplomatic Spillover? Assessing the Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on Canada-Russia Relations,*

**Abstract**

In Canada, the Harper government has pursued a noticeable pro-Kiev policy over the Ukraine crisis. In March 2014, the Ukrainian flag was “proudly flown” over Parliament Hill in Ottawa to demonstrate Canada’s “solidarity with [the] people of Ukraine,” according to Prime Minister Stephen Harper. A few days later, Harper was the first G7 leader to visit the Ukrainian interim government in Kiev following the coup the month before, and has also compared – followed by various other Canadian ministers – the “annexation” of Crimea by Russia as a Third Reich aggression before the Second World War. In his view, Russian actions against Ukraine are “aggressive, militaristic, and imperialistic” and therefore pose a “significant threat to peace and stability of the world.” And more recently, in June, as peace-talks between Russia and the Ukraine seemed to progress, Canada’s foreign affairs minister John Baird traveled to Brussels, Helsinki and Stockholm carrying with him “a clear message to President Putin: that [Canada and its allies] remain united in our support for Ukraine and [will] not stand by and watch Russia [employ] provocative and destabilizing actions.” Thus Canada’s closeness with West-Ukraine through such powerful (and possibly consequential) narratives appears to go beyond other NATO allies’ postures vis-à-vis Ukraine that were mostly reflected by economic sanctions during the crisis. Considering Canada’s policy towards Ukraine, have there been any notable or concrete consequences on Canada-Russia relations? Can we speak of a diplomatic ‘spillover effect’ on both countries as allies? In this paper, our objective is to seek a better understanding of the spillover effect by looking at three aspects of the Canada-Russia relationship: a) cooperation through the Arctic Council; b) military cooperation with NATO; and c) bilateral Canada-Russia relations in general. Through extensive document analysis, individual interviews, governmental documents and media commentaries, we conclude that their has been a political and perceptual impact on all of these aspects – i.e. political spillover effect; but because of compartmentalization of the relationship, there is no significant evidence to support the extension of this spillover to public policies between Canada and Russia.

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*Neoliberal discourses and their influence on economic development, state sovereignty and bordering in the Canadian Arctic*

**Abstract**

This paper explores the way in which Canada’s northern territorial development agenda both reflects and reinforces current and substantive interests of Arctic security and sovereignty now promoted by the Canadian government. It is particularly interested in exploring the current political, economic and spatial synergies informing recent rounds of state-centered interest directed towards ‘protecting’ ‘Canadian’ sovereign territory. This sovereignty mandate, as it has been constructed through various actors and agencies to have had tremendous potential to create a series of cascading impacts throughout the Canadian North, ultimately influencing regional and local boundaries of self-governance and co-management.

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*Icelandic Security and Defense Policy in the 21st century: towards a Nordic Security Community?*

**Abstract**

For over 50 years, Iceland and the U.S. collaborated in a close knit security community, whose pillar was a 1951 U.S. – Icelandic bilateral Defence Agreement. From 1951 the U.S provided Iceland with military defences, but in 2006 the U.S. closed its Keflavík Naval Air Station (NASKEF) and removed all of its military forces from Iceland, although the 1951 bilateral Defence Agreement is still effective. Since 2006, Icelandic security and defence policy has gone through a comprehensive revision. Icelandic decision makers have defined Iceland’s security interests within a wider security framework, and have sought increased security cooperation with its NATO and non-NATO Nordic neighbours. In 2009, the Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, responsible for civil protection and emergency management, issued the *Haga Declaration* calling for strengthening of Nordic cooperation in the area of emergency management. Moreover, that same year the *Stoltenberg* report brought forth 13 specific proposals for increased Nordic security cooperation. In 2014, one of the Stoltenberg proposals became a reality when Finland and Sweden participated in Norwegian NATO Air Policing in Iceland. The increased security cooperation between Nordic NATO and non-NATO members raises the question whether these are the first tentative steps towards a distinct Nordic Security Community, and if so, whether that community will provide Iceland with the security and defence cooperation that it desires.

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*The Evolving concept of security, and security in the Arctic*

**Abstract**

With the rapid sea-ice melting and global clitmate change, the Arctic is changing from a geoplitical perifery to a geopolitical centre. While there is a huge potential to exploit the rich resources and open the new shipping route in the Arctic, there also has been great concers about the Arctic security uncertainties. The crisis beyond the Arctic also has added the profound uncertainty in the Arctic security. Taking into account the general trends of the low tension in the Arctic after the Cold War, we should expand the concept of security and recoside the sicurity in the Arctic in terms of new concept of security, including common security, comhensive security, cooperative security, and sustainable security. This paper is, based on the anlysis of the security situation in the Arctic after the Cold War, to explore the evolving concept of security in the IR theory, and to focus on how to creat the favorable security environment for the better governance in the Arctic in the future.

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*China and Arctic Security***,**

**Abstract**

As a non-Arctic states, China has more focus on non-traditional security of Arctic rather than traditional security. Most Arctic security researches are on the impact of climate change on sea level and food security; the impact of used nuclear fuel on environment and fishery; the shipping route security and economic security etc.. At the same time, China also keeps an eye on the development of Arctic geopolitics, Arctic traditional security. Firstly, it is hard to be blind to the great changes due to the climate change and the opening of sea route. Secondly, the exercises and military expansion in Northern sea create intension on the regional security. Thirdly, Arctic is the area in which it is easy to access to states in the Northern Hemisphere which is considered a threat to Chinese sovereignty security. Fourthly, the nuclear submarine in Arctic is also a Chinese concern on Arctic traditional security. China is glad to be involved into search and rescue cooperation, environmental cooperation and shipping security cooperation instead of military activities. As from Chinese government and academic’s opinion, Arctic’s economic benefit is very potential, the involvement of cooperation and governance with Arctic states is the most important step for China to get the benefit of natural resource and shipping route. There is no need to raise intention among China and Arctic states.

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*Russia’s military strategies in the Arctic: looking for new priorities?,*

**Abstract**

In contrast with Western perceptions of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, this paper argues that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region. Moscow’s military strategies in the Arctic pursue three major goals: first, to ascertain Russia’s sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities. The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim to upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race. Moscow favors soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.

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*Community-based monitoring and regional Arctic governance*

**Abstract**

As climate change melts the Arctic ice cap it is making Northern shipping routes more accessible alongside expanding exploration and development of hydrocarbons and other extractive industries which require the Arctic’s waterways to help transfer these resources to refineries and to market. To address this fast growing reality, the Arctic Council has begun to pass a number of related binding declarations. These initiatives, while an important first step, have a long way to go to sufficiently connect its activities with those indigenous communities who live where the development will take place. This paper looks at this changing Arctic political and legal landscape as a point of departure to analyse the legal insufficiencies of traditional positivist, Westphalian law and international relations (IR) theory to address the existing and expected increase in extractive industrial development in the Arctic. This includes conceptualising ways for indigenous communities to act as first responders, to serve as official monitors of on and off-shore Arctic activities, as well as being able to control and benefit from all development that takes place in indigenous governed areas.

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*Bottom-up security. Paradiplomacy as the last chance for keeping in touch in the (European) Arctic,*

**Abstract**

In the current “Interesting Times” traditional actors (e.g. Arctic states) cannot guarantee positive communication between themselves. Disruption of communication causes alienation of people, and may result in a conflict. Continuing communication is a basis for cooperation; both on local, regional, national, trans-national levels (see e.g. Deutsch 1963, 1979). Thus, keeping positive communication is an important political priority. State policies and strategies should not impede communication on the lower levels of territorial hierarchy, on the local, regional, societal level; in contrast, they should facilitate it. Even in the Cold War times, the Iron Curtain was penetrated by multiple paradiplomatic activities, such as sister cities cooperation (Grunert 1981; Zelinsky 1991; Weyreter 2003), or the trans-national peace movements, such as triennial North Calotte’s Peace Days, which became a forum for cooperation between people in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Soviet Union aiming to promote peace and disarmament (Heininen 2004). During the last quarter of a century, the mentioned types of societal communication continuously loosen their roles, as more institutionalized forms of paradiplomacy occurred in the New Northern Europe. This firstly relates to the cross-border cooperation processes, instruments and structures (i.e. cross-border regions).

Cross-border regions possess an important communicational function: they provide permanent interaction between different categories of actors – from national, regional and local officials to business persons, NGOs and civil activists. Recently, on the basis of the well-established cross-border regions, the multilevel and multilateral programmes of cross-border cooperation have been launched. The ENPI CBC Programmes involve regional and local actors from Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia. Many policy principles and approaches, which are deep-rooted in EUropean politics, are applicable for these programmes. The “partnership principle” is among others.

This paper aims at looking on the current situation/trends in the sphere of cross-border cooperation in the European North in general, with a special attention to the cross-border partnership on the border between Russia and Nordic countries. The author will argue for more appropriate realization of the partnership principle in order to promote a wider cross-border and trans-national communication and cooperation in the foreseeable future.

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1. On a waiting list, if there will be more time allocated for presentations. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)